Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Tuesday, May 15, 2018 - 9:30am
Location:
Dirksen 106
Witnesses
Director
William R.
Evanina
National Counterintelligence and Security Center Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- Opening Statement
- Response to Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees
- Response to Committee Additional Pre-Hearing Questions
- Response to Committee Questions for the Record
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 115-396]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-396
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM R. EVANINA TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, MAY 15, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
MARCO RUBIO, Florida RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
----------
Chris Joyner, Staff Director
Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
MAY 15, 2018
OPENING STATEMENTS
Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1
Warner, Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia..... 2
WITNESS
William R. Evanina, nominated to be Director, National
Counterintelligence and Security Center........................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 26
Additional Prehearing Questions.................................. 48
Questions for the Record......................................... 75
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM R. EVANINA TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 15, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in Room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Burr, Warner, Rubio, Lankford, Wyden, Heinrich,
King, and Harris.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Chairman Burr. I'd like to call this hearing to order. I'd
like to welcome our witness today, Bill Evanina, President
Trump's nominee to be Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, or NCSC.
Bill, congratulations on your nomination. I'd like to note
that you've already served honorably as Director of NCSC since
June of 2014, before the position required Senate confirmation,
necessitating this hearing. So, this is a little bit out of the
ordinary.
I'd like to start by recognizing your family: your wife,
JulieAnne, and your sons, Dominic, who's 13, and Will, who is
19 months old and currently holding down the fort at home.
[Laughter.]
I had an opportunity to meet your wife and oldest son as we
had breakfast this morning, and I just want to say thank you
for allowing him to serve so many years in government. And to
Dominic, thank you for your dad, because he does important
stuff. I want you to know that.
Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the
committee to consider the nominee's qualifications and to allow
for thoughtful deliberation by the members.
Director Evanina has provided substantive written responses
to over 55 questions presented by the committee. And, today, of
course, committee members will be able to ask additional
questions and to hear from him in open session.
Director Evanina graduated from Wilkes University and
earned a master's degree in educational leadership from Arcadia
University. He has served in government for over 23 years,
including service as a supervisory special agent and assistant
section chief with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
prior to joining NCSC served as chief of counterespionage at
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Director Evanina, you're being asked to lead this agency
during a period of significant and wide-ranging
counterintelligence threats against our Nation. I'm hopeful
that, moving forward, you'll be an influential and forceful
advocate for those foreign intelligence tools you believe are
necessary to keep our citizens safe while protecting Americans'
privacy.
As I've mentioned to others during this nomination hearing,
I can assure you that this committee will faithfully follow its
charter and conduct vigorous and real-time oversight of the
intelligence community, its operations and its activities.
We'll ask difficult and probing questions of you, your staff;
and we expect honest, complete and timely responses. I look
forward to supporting your nomination and ensuring
consideration without delay.
Thank you again for being here. I look forward to your
testimony.
I'll now recognize the Vice Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to echo the Chairman's remarks in welcoming Bill
Evanina today. Obviously, Bill, 22-year veteran of the FBI,
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center. As the Chairman mentioned, you've had this job for four
years. But we thought it was so important that we made it
Senate-confirmed, so you get to go through your first
confirmation hearing process. You're obviously no stranger to
this committee and all the members on the committee. You've
briefed us many times, and I think you bring remarkable skills
to this position.
In my questions today, I want to focus on two issues. One
is security clearances. This committee has had a couple
hearings on that subject, both open and closed. We all know the
DNI is the government's security executive agent and you as the
DNI's point person have to take the lead on that.
As you've acknowledged, and I think this committee
additionally has acknowledged, the current system is broken:
740,000-person backlog, costs too much, takes too long, way too
complex. We've had lots of testimony about continuous
evaluation, better use of technology, trying to knock down, on
the DOD side, a big amount of that backlog. I'd like this
morning if you would add a little more details and provide us
any update.
The second issue that I want to focus on will be your role
to oversee the counterintelligence security activities across
the U.S. government, particularly with regards to some of our
near-peer nation-state adversaries, Russia, China, their whole-
of-society approaches. I believe, particularly the challenge
posed by China in terms of its acquisition of our technology
secrets, and their penetration of starting at early stage
companies, through the penetration of universities, and some of
the companies that this committee has highlighted in the past.
We're going to need to up our game on that. So I look forward
to your testimony on that subject as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the witness'
testimony.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
Bill, could I ask you to stand and raise your right hand?
Do you solemnly swear to give the committee the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Evanina. I do.
Chairman Burr. Please be seated.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM R. EVANINA, NOMINATED TO BE THE DIRECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER
Chairman Burr. Director, before we move to your statement,
I'll ask you five standard questions that the committee poses
to each nominee who appears before us. They just require a
simple yes-or-no answer.
Do you agree to appear before the committee here or in
other venues when invited?
Mr. Evanina. Yes.
Chairman Burr. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials
from your office to appear before the committee and designated
staff when invited?
Mr. Evanina. Yes.
Chairman Burr. Do you agree to provide documents or any
other materials requested by the committee in order to carry
out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Mr. Evanina. Yes.
Chairman Burr. Will you ensure that your office and your
staff provides such materials to the committee when requested?
Mr. Evanina. Yes.
Chairman Burr. And fifth, do you agree to inform and fully
brief to the fullest extent possible all members of the
committee on all intelligence activities, rather than just the
Chairman and the Vice Chairman?
Mr. Evanina. Yes.
Chairman Burr. Thank you very much.
We'll now proceed to your opening statement, after which
I'll recognize members by seniority for five minutes. Bill, the
floor is yours.
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman, Vice Chairman, members: I have issued a statement
for the record which I'd like to be added to the record and
I'll have some brief comments.
It's an honor to appear with you today to consider my
nomination to be the first Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, or NCSC. It's also an
honor and privilege that this Congress has decided this
position to be important enough to make it a Senate-confirmed
position. I'm also honored the President and Director of
National Intelligence Dan Coats have the trust and confidence
in me to fulfill this position.
I would first like to express my gratitude to my family: my
father John, my mother Barbara, my brother Steven, my sister
Tanya, most especially my wife, JulieAnne, and my sons Dominic
and Will.
Lastly, I would like to thank the women and men of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, who are
dedicated professionals, and their successes in the last few
years have made NCSC the global leader in counterintelligence
and security.
Mr. Chairman, I was born and raised in Peckville,
Pennsylvania, a small blue-collar town just north of Scranton.
There, through my family and friends, I learned the value of
integrity, hard work and service to others.
One of those neighbors was Gino Merli, private first class
in the U.S. Army during World War II. Mr. Merli was awarded the
Medal of Honor, two Purple Hearts and a Bronze Star for his
heroic activities in the Battle of the Bulge. Spending time
with Mr. Merli and other role models growing up, I learned the
value of character, citizenship and service, and we should
never take our democracy or freedom for granted.
Mr. Chairman, I am proud to be a career public servant.
I've been in Federal service for over 29 years, 22 of which as
a proud member of the FBI. I've held a wide spectrum of
positions in the FBI and, as you mentioned, chief of the
Central Intelligence Agency's counterespionage group.
Mr. Chairman, the threat we face from our adversaries is
progressive, persistent, and requires constant mitigation by
our government and private sector. The most prominent and
enduring nation-state intelligence threats will continue to be
Russia and China. However, Iran, North Korea and others are
prominent with their intent and increasing capabilities.
I believe the aggressive Russian intelligence services will
continue their efforts to interfere and create distrust in our
democratic processes, encourage anti-U.S. political views, and
weaken our U.S. partnerships and European allies.
China's utilization of intelligence services and
nontraditional collectors to advance their national development
continues to place our national security at risk. The U.S. must
continually and aggressively respond to China's systematic
theft of U.S. technology, trade secrets, proprietary data,
research and development across wide swaths of the U.S.
economy. Mr. Chairman, I proffer today that our economic
security is our national security.
Mr. Chairman, historically, the mitigation of these
national security threats lay solely at the feet of the
intelligence community and Federal law enforcement. I proffer
today, that to successfully thwart the threats and the
complexity that we see not only requires a whole-of-government
approach, but a whole-of-country approach.
Mr. Chairman, insider threats are a pernicious intelligence
vulnerability that we face every day. Although we'll never
eliminate the possibility of a bad actor within our walls, we
continue to strive toward enhanced technical and behavioral
solutions to prevent catastrophic damage, as well as to develop
creative solutions to prevent and deter this activity.
Mr. Chairman, as you and the Vice Chairman are fully aware,
our government security clearance process is outdated and
inefficient. It is currently undergoing a comprehensive
overhaul.
We plan and will develop and implement a process that
results in the expeditious onboarding of qualified U.S.
citizens both into government and in cleared industry with
agility and reciprocity. At the same time, we must not reduce
the quality of the investigations, to ensure that we are
bringing on a quality, highly trusted workforce to protect our
secrets.
If confirmed, and as the executor of the DNI's role of
security executive agent, I am committed to leading this
effort, in partnership with the Office of Personnel Management,
the Office of Management and Budget, and Department of Defense.
Mr. Chairman, I am humbled. If confirmed, I would become
the first Senate-confirmed Director representing the men and
women of the NCSC. As well, I will represent the men and women
who have toiled for decades in the counterintelligence security
field, often without attribution and knowledge. They do so to
protect our people, our data, our secrets and our Nation.
Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, members of the
committee, thank you again for your consideration of my
nomination. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Evanina follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Burr. Bill, thank you very much for that
testimony. The Chair would recognize himself, and then the Vice
Chairman and then members by seniority for up to five minutes
of questions.
Bill, we've talked about it before: Leaks of classified
information put sensitive sources and methods at risk and cause
irreparable damage to our national security. Congress took
action accordingly in the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act
of 2017 by imposing enhanced penalties on those convicted of
unauthorized disclosures.
If confirmed, how do you plan to address insider threats
and the security of sensitive and classified information?
Mr. Evanina. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. And
I would concur that the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information is not only traumatic to the secrets that we lose
as a country, but they're also harmful and insidious to the men
and women who serve to protect them every day.
If confirmed, I will continue to work with my Federal law
enforcement partners, both at the FBI and Department of
Justice, to enhance not only the investigations, but the
penalties for such unauthorized disclosures, as well as with
the intelligence community, to enhance their ability to
identify unauthorized disclosures within their walls and
provide the most effective and efficient monitoring and provide
information where that information--to the Department of
Justice and the FBI for prosecution.
Chairman Burr. Good.
Foreign counterintelligence threats to our government
supply chain continue to increase and China has become a big
part of these threats. In your experience in
counterintelligence both at NCSC and in your prior positions at
CIA and the Bureau, how has China's counterintelligence threat
grown? And what should we be concerned with?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do believe China is
one of the gravest concerns that we have moving forward as a
Nation with respect to our economic security. China's
utilization of a whole-of-government approach towards the
United States to increase their economic and military
development is problematic.
The utilization of nontraditional collectors here in the
United States--engineers, scientists, students in school--and
their ability to, from a cyber-enabled perspective, identify
and attract unclassified data from our research facilities,
continues to allow the U.S. to not only lose positions, jobs,
research and funding, as well as provide first-to-market
capability to the Chinese and take our ingenuity and
proprietary data and trade secrets away.
Chairman Burr. In your response to the committee's
questions, you stated that some of the greatest challenges to
NCSC include conducting effective and sustained outreach to
Federal partners, research labs and the private sector, as well
as securing funding for supply-chain risk management. What are
the plans for improving our government's supply-chain risk
management?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Supply-chain
mitigation efforts are nothing new to the U.S. However, in the
last couple years they've become increasingly problematic via
awareness. What NCSC does is provide that sliver of
counterintelligence aspect to the who and why is implementing
and mitigating our supply chain, our adversaries. And we
provide and work in partnership with the non-Title 50
organizations, General Services Administration, the labs, the
weapons labs, DOE labs, to provide awareness and what the
threat is emanating from our adversaries, to help them
mitigate, from their perspective, and protect their data from
leaving their facilities.
Chairman Burr. I thank you for that, and I want to
encourage you that in the role of Director please continue to
focus on that greatly. This committee has been extremely
involved in supply chain concerns that we have, and it seems to
slip through the cracks from a jurisdictional standpoint in
Congress and, for that fact, in government.
Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Bill, I'm going to start with clearance reform. I think
you'll recall when we had the hearings, bipartisan complete
agreement the system is broken. It's 740,000-plus on the
backlog. This is a security risk. This is an economic risk in
terms of our ability then to brief companies.
I was very concerned that we invited all the relevant
parties to testify. OMB chose not to. I would like you to give
us an update on whether OMB is on the team now in trying to
make this a priority.
And we'd had some discussion that that large-number
backlog, you were going to be able to cut a dramatic amount of
that backlog back in a relatively short timeline. Can you give
us an update on that?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Vice Chairman Warner.
Yes. As a matter of fact, I think subsequent to our
beginning this process back in March, in our Trusted Workforce
2.0 initiative, with our partners, Office of Management and
Budget, OPM and DOD, as well as a host of other organizations
and departments, we have been working diligently to provide
this committee and the government with two specific things.
Number one, a dramatic reduction to the backlog; and number
two, the development of a new business process of how we will
vet qualified citizens in the U.S. in an agile, expeditious
manner, at the same time making sure they're trusted.
With respect to your question on the backlog, we currently
are in the final stages of a paper for the DNI to issue that's
being coordinated through the intergovernmental process right
now, which I believe, with some dramatic changes to how we
currently do the business process of investigations, once
implemented, will probably get us to a position we could
estimate probably a 20 percent reduction to backlog within six
months.
Vice Chairman Warner. Only 20 percent in six months? That's
a little less ambitious than I think we discussed earlier. And
is OMB part of the process at this point?
Mr. Evanina. OMB is a major part of the process. Again, the
four main individuals are OMB, OPM, DOD and ODNI.
Vice Chairman Warner. Well, and will these new business
processes include reciprocity and common standards between
government and our contractors?
Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Warner. Again, my hope would be, since I
understand a lot of these were on the Secret level, the DOD has
said there was an ability to take, I thought, a much greater
percentage of that backlog down with administrative action.
And then, on a going-forward basis I would hope that we
would see a reduction greater than 20 percent. That would only
take us down--you know, if we moved from 740,000 to half a
million, that still doesn't do very well if we're at the end of
this calendar year.
Mr. Evanina. Senator, I agree with you and concur. I think
some of the contingencies will be predicated upon the transfer
of the MBIB inventory to DOD and how that impacts the planned
mitigation efforts. We do not have an effective algorithm for
that at this moment, but we are excited. That 20 percent is
probably a conservative number.
Vice Chairman Warner. On the question of
counterintelligence with China, again, a number of members on
this committee have raised concerns about certain of the
Chinese telecom companies and their penetration into the
American market. I was actually pleased that the President
acted on one of those companies, ZTE.
Now, it appears that that is simply a bargaining chip in
negotiations with China. I don't think that is the appropriate
way. If this is a security threat, it is a security threat and
needs to be dealt with as such, not as a bargaining chip in
terms of greater trade negotiations. My concern as well is that
we are asking purchasers of equipment at local government,
private sector, we're asking others who are in the venture
community and others to understand the threat of China, but I
don't believe we can fully brief that threat if they don't have
appropriate security clearances within their own institutions--
again, another challenge that comes out of the backlog issue.
How will we be able to move aggressively on having a
standardized brief to universities, tech companies, VCs on the
real threat of China? That brief I think will have to be some
parts classified, as well as unclassified. Do you want to
address that?
Mr. Evanina. Vice Chairman, I would concur. And I think
over the last two years we've made a lot of progress with our
interagency partners, the FBI and DHS, in promulgating such
advice and awareness and threat to not only academia and
industry, with respect to the threat from China and other
nation-states who are pernicious in their stealing our
proprietary data and trade secrets. We will continue to do that
and work with the associations.
And I concur with your point that I think private-sector
leadership, that is at the CEO level, needs to be a little bit
more active in terms of obtaining security clearances so that
that information that is classified can get to them in a more
effective and efficient manner.
Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to pick up, Mr. Evanina, on the Vice Chairman's
point with respect to ZTE specifically. And thank you for the
visit we had in our office. I thought it was very helpful.
Now, in 2012, the House Intelligence Committee issued a
non-classified bipartisan report on national security issues
posed by the Chinese telecom companies, and one of them was
ZTE. The report concluded that the risks associated with ZTE's
provision of equipment to U.S. critical infrastructure could
undermine American national security interests. Do you agree
with that bipartisan report?
Mr. Evanina. Senator Wyden, I do.
Senator Wyden. Okay. Now, they recommended that the United
States should view with suspicion the continued penetration of
the U.S. telecommunications market by ZTE. Do you agree with
that?
Mr. Evanina. Yes.
Senator Wyden. Now, I appreciate the response. The
President's comment over the weekend about ZTE I think
obviously raises extraordinary national security questions, as
well as economic policy concerns. So, if you're confirmed, I
hope you're going to stand up to the White House on this issue.
Let me ask something with respect to where things stand
now. What are the national security implications of giving ZTE
sanctions relief?
Mr. Evanina. Well, Senator Wyden, I'm not particularly up
to speed with the sanctions with regard specifically to ZTE. I
will say that the intelligence community and Federal law
enforcement is on the record with this committee and the
American people with respect to the threat posed by China
Telecom.
Senator Wyden. But as a general proposition, giving
sanctions relief to a company like this, where there has been a
bipartisan, non-classified report, as a general proposition
that strikes me as a mistake from a counterintelligence
standpoint, from a cyber-security standpoint, from an economic
policy standpoint. So just tell me, as a general proposition,
whether you would agree with that.
Mr. Evanina. Well, Senator, I would agree that we will
continue to provide the policymakers in this body with the
relevant intelligence information to have effective policy----
Senator Wyden. That's not the question I'm asking. Set
aside ZTE. As a general proposition, does that raise the
concerns I mentioned--economics, national security, cyber-
security? Seems to me it's pretty low-hanging fruit here to say
yes.
Mr. Evanina. Well, Senator, again I'm not up to speed with
the sanctions per se with your reference. So I would have to
continue with--we will continue advising on the foreign
intelligence threat to policymakers who want to employ those
sanctions.
Senator Wyden. Let me ask you one other question. What has
been learned, again from a counterintelligence standpoint,
since the OPM breach? You know, obviously, that affected an
extraordinary number of Americans. I would hope that that would
be seen as a wake-up call and there would be some substantive
changes.
So what has been learned? What has changed since the OPM
breach?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you for that question, Senator Wyden.
I think that the biggest OPM reflection is that I think we
learned as a country that nothing is off limits from foreign
adversary attack here, specifically in our non-Title 50
organizations in our country and government as a whole. The
intelligence community is no longer just the target and victim
of adversaries; that as a country we need to be aware of our
proprietary data, trade secrets and PII.
Senator Wyden. Let me ask you one other question about
encryption. Obviously counterintelligence risks are not limited
just to classified systems. Extremely politically sensitive
information is conveyed every day by government officials and
members of Congress over unsecured phones. Should the
intelligence community recommend that policymakers encrypt
their unclassified phone conversations?
Mr. Evanina. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wyden. Okay. Thank you. I hope that you will think
some more about this matter that has been raised by ZTE. I can
understand why you might not want to comment about a specific
company. But, I'm telling you, as a general proposition, this
ought to be an enormous alarm bell from the standpoint of
counterintelligence, cyber-security, and economics. So I hope
you'll think more about that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Evanina, for being here.
Would you ever use a ZTE phone?
Mr. Evanina. I would not, Senator.
Senator Rubio. Would you recommend anyone in any sort of
position that's sensitive, whether in commerce or in government
or in contracting, use a ZTE phone?
Mr. Evanina. No, I would not.
Senator Rubio. So it's not an exaggeration to be--there's
somehow the notion out there by some that this is a hysteria,
not just unique to ZTE. But it is a fact, is it not, that China
utilizes its telecommunication companies for purposes of
espionage. Even if those companies' leadership may not be open
to it, they don't really have a choice but to be cooperative.
Mr. Evanina. Senator Rubio, we've been on the record in the
intelligence community and law enforcement of that fact.
Senator Rubio. There's an additional national security
factor at play, and that is that Made in China 2025 is an
endeavor by the Chinese government to dominate the top fields
of the 21st century, many of them in telecommunications,
aerospace, biomedicine, et cetera. If in fact they achieve that
because they're more competitive, because they have better
ideas, because they out-innovate us, that's one thing. But
that's not how they're pursuing it. How they are pursuing it,
is it not, is they are stealing intellectual property, reverse-
engineering, the transfer of intellectual property?
There is a strategic aim on the part of the Chinese
government to steal the commercial intellectual property of
this country in order to advance themselves into a position of
dominance in these key fields. Is that not something that is
pretty clear?
Mr. Evanina. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Rubio. And that poses a national security threat,
because our commercial capacity--just like our shipbuilding
capacity is important to our military hardware and our
aerospace is, our technological capacity in the private sector.
If we lose the high ground and another nation is dominant
because they cheated their way into that position, does that
not pose a direct national security threat to the United
States?
Mr. Evanina. It does, Senator. And, as I mentioned, I
believe our economic security is our national security.
Senator Rubio. Now, I want to talk about a separate topic
that has not, I don't believe, ever been discussed before,
certainly not today. As you know, we live in an environment
where false claims, even ones that are totally preposterous,
can easily be spread on social media. And often the media,
under tremendous pressure to deliver clicks on their website or
ratings on their television station through outrage, are quick
to jump on it.
I raise that because of the concept of something called
``deep fakes.'' Are you familiar with that term?
Mr. Evanina. I am not, sir.
Senator Rubio. A deep fake is the ability to manipulate
sound, images, or video to make it appear that a certain person
did something that they didn't do. These videos in fact are
increasingly realistic. The quality of these fakes is rapidly
increasing due to artificial intelligence. Machine learning
algorithms are paired with facial mapping software to make it
easy and cheap to insert someone's face into a video and
produce a very realistic-looking video of someone saying or
doing something they never said or did.
This, by the way, technology is pretty widely available on
the internet and people have used it already for all sorts of
nefarious purposes at the individual level. I think you can
only imagine what a nation-state could do with that technology,
particularly to our politics.
If we could imagine for a moment, a foreign intelligence
agency could use deep fakes to produce a fake video of an
American politician using a racial epithet or taking a bribe or
anything of that nature. They could use a fake video of a U.S.
soldier massacring civilians overseas. They could use a fake
video of a U.S. official admitting a secret plan to do some
conspiracy theory of some kind. They could use a fake video of
a prominent official discussing some sort of impending disaster
that could sow panic. And imagine a compelling video like this
produced on the eve of an election or a few days before major
public policy decision with a culture that has already a kind
of a built-in bias towards believing outrageous things, a media
that is quick to promulgate it and spread it, and of course
social media, where you can't stop its spread.
I believe that this is the next wave of attacks against
America and Western democracies, is the ability to produce fake
videos that can only be determined to be fake after extensive
analytical analysis, and by then the election is over and
millions of Americans have seen an image that they want to
believe anyway because of their preconceived bias against that
individual.
You've never heard of that term, but I ask you, is there
any work being done anywhere in the U.S. government to begin to
confront the threat that could be posed, or will be posed in my
view, by the ability to produce realistic-looking fake video
and audio that could be used to cause all sorts of chaos in our
country?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator Rubio, for that question.
And the answer is yes. The entire intelligence community and
Federal law enforcement is actively working to not only
understand the complexities and capabilities of our
adversaries, but what, from a predictive analysis perspective,
we may face going forward, particularly with the election this
fall, as well as in 2020.
Chairman Burr. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Mr. Evanina, welcome.
The DOD has recently banned sales of ZTE phones at military
exchanges, as well as Huawei equipment. And last month, the
Commerce Department banned China's smartphone maker, ZTE, from
using U.S. technology after it illegally shipped U.S. goods to
both Iran and to North Korea. This comes after numerous
intelligence community warnings that ZTE poses a major cyber-
security threat.
Yet, as we saw this week, President Trump announced that he
is working with the Chinese president to give ZTE, quote, ``a
way to get back into business fast,'' end quote.
Do you assess that ZTE represents an economic or security
threat to the United States?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you for the question, Senator. I believe
the intelligence community and law enforcement are clearly on
the record, both in the public and in classified settings, with
the threat from Chinese telecommunications companies.
Senator Heinrich. Are you concerned from a
counterintelligence perspective? Does it make sense to overrule
the advice and judgment of the national security community and
to offer ZTE a way to get back into business fast?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I believe our role in the
intelligence community and the counterintelligence community is
to provide the relevant facts of the issue in the
investigations to the policymakers for their decision-making
processes.
Senator Heinrich. How are you raising those facts with this
White House?
Mr. Evanina. We are garnering the support of the entire
intelligence community and regulatory community. And, as a
matter of fact, I think we've had meetings as recently as
yesterday at the White House.
Senator Heinrich. If China believes that we are willing to
use national security matters as bargaining chips in trade
negotiations, how do you think that will impact their behavior,
moving forward?
Mr. Evanina. Senator, thanks for the question. I'm not an
expert on the Chinese diplomatic processes, but I can tell you
that our national security is first and foremost in our
perspective. And the whole-of-country approach posed by China
clearly makes it difficult for us to bifurcate the issues.
Senator Heinrich. So two months ago DHS and the FBI issued
a rare public alert about a large-scale Russian cyber campaign
targeting the U.S. power grid and other critical infrastructure
with an intent to extract information and potentially lay a
foundation for future offensive operations. This alert went
further than past alerts, confirming Russia as the culprit and
including indicators of compromise and a list of detection and
prevention measures.
What's happened since March of this year, when the alert
went out? And is this Russian cyber campaign ongoing?
Mr. Evanina. Senator, thank you for that question. And I
would agree that the pervasive threat from the cyber
perspective by the Russian government continues today and will
into the future.
The Federal Government, specifically the intelligence
community, Federal law enforcement and DHS, have been working
with the private sector every day.
As a matter of fact, NCSC, we brought in not only the
Department of Energy, but major companies in the fuel, gas and
oil perspective to give them a one-day read-in in a classified
brief of the threat, so we could help them mitigate those
issues back in their home facilities.
Senator Heinrich. Did that include utilities as well?
Mr. Evanina. It did.
Senator Heinrich. Are you seeing a greater sense of urgency
on the part of utility companies and other energy institutions
to utilize this new information?
Mr. Evanina. Yes.
Senator Heinrich. Are we getting utility leadership through
the clearance process fast enough?
Mr. Evanina. I'm not sure about that, Senator. I'd have to
get back to you with respect to the speed at which that's
occurring.
Senator Heinrich. Because that's another concern. And I
know Senator Warner brought up the overall issue. I mean, one
of the things that we have heard on the Energy and Natural
Resources Committee is, that even former members of Congress
who served on the relevant intelligence committee, can't get
through that process.
And so, if we don't have partners who are read in on the
other side, it makes it very difficult for those utilities and
those other energy institutions to actually implement the
changes that they need to implement.
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I believe, working closely
with DHS--they are working diligently to provide an expeditious
process to get individuals and companies cleared so they can
receive this threat information on a real-time basis.
Senator Heinrich. You've said that continuous evaluation is
not the future, it's now, and that the government honestly has
not done a good job. Industry is able to conduct continuous
evaluation of their employees. Why has it been difficult for
the government to do so? And what can we do about that?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
Continuous evaluation has been a constant bedrock in the
intelligence community for years. What we've been asked to do
at NCSC, through the auspices of the ODNI, from this committee
is provide a robust continuous evaluation program for the rest
of the Executive Branch, and we have done that. We are probably
80 percent complete, ahead of schedule, hope to be fully
complete by the end of the year. We are expecting to have 20-
plus agencies and 100,000 Federal employees outside the
intelligence community enrolled into our continuous evaluation
plan.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Evanina.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Thanks for being here and for going through this process.
And by the way, thank you for your years of service leading up
to this. It's exceptionally valuable for the country.
You make several very interesting statements in your
opening statement and in your written statement that I want to
be able to ask you to drill down a little bit deeper on. You
made this statement: ``A growing set of threat actors are now
capable of using cyber operations to remotely access
traditional intelligence targets, as well as a broader set of
U.S. targets, including critical infrastructure and supply
chain, often without attribution.''
What are you recommending there? You're making a statement
there, but you're also making a recommendation.
Mr. Evanina. Thank you for that question, Senator Lankford.
I believe that we as a Nation need to be more in a true public-
private partnership with those out in our country who actually
make things and build things--our utility companies, the
energy, telecommunications and financial networks that are the
bedrock of our Nation. The government needs to partner in a
very, very close manner with them, so they can understand the
threat and provide efforts to help mitigate that threat.
Senator Lankford. So what does that look like? In a public-
private partnership, are you talking about government dictating
how this would work in the private industry and the private
industry does it? The private industry sets a set of standards
from NIST or from wherever it may be?
Is this DHS? What entity do you think does that? And where
does that happen most efficiently?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I believe that it's a
combination, starting with DHS. What we do at NCSC is provide
that sliver of counterintelligence threat to not only the DHS
and Department of Energy, but as well as all those companies,
so they can understand the who and why and what's happening,
and then help other Federal organizations and regulators
provide mitigation to those. If I believe that those companies
out there providing those services don't understand the threat
and how it's manifested, they can't be in an effective position
to prevent it.
Senator Lankford. What's the best way for them to get
information about the threat? If I'm a pipeline company in
Oklahoma, what's the best way for me to be able to determine
what's the real threats that are coming at me?
Mr. Evanina. Two ways, sir: through the Department of
Energy, as well as the FERC, who is the regulator for that
organization we work very closely with to provide threat
information. And I believe that process is pretty effective.
Senator Lankford. Talk to me a little bit about hiring and
retaining individuals for the team. You've got a lot of
competition getting some of the best folks. We've got some
incredible patriots that are there because of their love for
their country and their respect for the rule of law. What are
you seeing right now for hiring and retaining individuals and
for the future?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I'm pretty aware that the
intelligence community continues to attract to the right type
of amazing U.S. citizens for their jobs. I believe that our
mission in the intelligence community will win the day. The
challenge is getting them in the door, as we spoke of. But I
believe the mission will keep them in for long periods of time.
The security clearance process has been--the undergoing of
the business process re-engineering will help get us the
individuals in the door quicker, more expeditious, not only in
the government, but in the private sector, including industry
as well.
Senator Lankford. You had a nice, long hesitation on the
security process, which all of us have incredible frustrations
with at this desk and those that are doing the hiring. What is
the right length of time to be able to get through a security
clearance? Because we will do a good security clearance, but
right now it's a ridiculous amount of time. What's the right
amount of time?
Mr. Evanina. Well, Senator, it's a trick question, but I'll
give you--I believe that Secret clearances and below, which are
primarily Department of Defense, I think in the end state we
should be able to clear 80 or 90 percent of those within 30
days.
Senator Lankford. How long will it take to get to that
spot, you think?
Mr. Evanina. Again, with my partners watching closely here,
I would have to say within the next two years we're able to get
to that as an official policy and implementation. It's a little
bit more complicated at the Top Secret level, as you're aware.
Senator Lankford. Sure.
Mr. Evanina. We're working on those metrics, as well.
Senator Lankford. Yes, but most people are not going
through the Top Secret level starting out through the
clearance. I think a 30-day, 45-day even, is a reasonable
amount of time to be able to go through a Secret clearance.
What is the time right now per clearance?
Mr. Evanina. It's closer to 100 days, sir.
Senator Lankford. Right. And for many people in excess of
that, and that's a major issue for us.
You also make some interesting comments about the election
security in your opening statement and in your written
statement. Your concerns continue to rise about a Russian
threat towards our election security. I know we're partnering
with DHS. My question to you is not about the threat; it's
about how we're responding to it. What's the current level of
cooperation between you and DHS in preparing for those threats
because DHS has the lead?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, sir.
And DHS has been a great partner, not only with the
intelligence side, but NPPD, who has direct interface with the
State and locals with respect to the election process, which--
elections are local. We have been working really closely with
them, bringing the entire intelligence community to service DHS
and provide real, up-to-date threat information like we have
never done before, so that DHS can manifest that information
and provide mitigation strategies for all elections who are at
the local level.
Senator Lankford. So cooperation and communication between
DHS and you are consistent right now?
Mr. Evanina. That's correct.
Senator Lankford. Okay, thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Burr. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Evanina, welcome. Delighted to have you here today and
appreciate the service that you've provided.
First, I want to associate myself with Senator Rubio's
comments and emphasize one point. He talked about the deep
fake, the idea of being able to create an alternative reality.
If you add to that the powers of social media, it's a perfect
storm of disinformation, because you can create the false
reality and then you can circulate it in a way that it's very
hard to counteract, to find, to see.
If somebody puts a negative ad about you on television, you
can put up your own ad to rebut it. In this case, you're
chasing smoke. It's all over the place--e-mails, Twitter,
Facebook. It's very difficult. So, I think this is a very
serious challenge.
That brings me to your comment on question 16 of the
prehearing questions. You said: ``I remain concerned that we
may still be underestimating Russian capabilities and plans to
influence the 2018 midterm and future elections.'' That's a
chilling statement. Could you elaborate on that a bit?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I would say that I don't
think anyone in my profession or the intelligence community
will underestimate the potential of the Russian Federation,
Vladimir Putin, or the intelligence service in their
capabilities, but, more importantly, their intent. And I think,
from what we saw in the last election cycle, their intent is
there and their capabilities are clearly there.
To your first statement regarding the deep fake, I think
that serves as an opportunity for us in the analytical
community and the Federal Government to provide enhanced
training and awareness of the deep fake; and maybe also an
opportunity to partner with the private sector and social media
companies to understand the capabilities of our adversaries on
our own social media networks.
Senator King. Well, the ultimate defense on that is for our
public to understand when they're being conned, for them to
realize where this is coming from. And I think sources are very
important.
You mentioned about the capabilities of the Russians and
their intent. Do you have any doubt about the accuracy of the
January 2017 report of the intelligence community on the
Russian activities in the 2016 election?
Mr. Evanina. I do not.
Senator King. Thank you.
I also want to emphasize a point that's been made several
times before. The clearance backlog is an enormous problem. My
frustration is, I can't find out a single point, the single
point in the United States government that's in charge of
solving this problem. And I know it's not you, but you're in a
key position. And I believe that in order to solve it it's
going to take--and I keep hearing ``whole-of-government.''
Whenever I hear ``whole-of-government,'' I think that means
``none-of-government.''
Somebody's got to be in charge, and I hope that you will
urge the administration, the IC, DNI, to take charge of this
issue so that it's not scattered all over the government,
because we've got to solve it. We had testimony there are
something like 950,000 security clearances in backlog, and
we're losing good people. There's an opportunity cost there,
and it's just unacceptable in terms of our ability to defend
the country.
So, I hope you will take on, as part of your mission,
pushing for an organizational response to this, where there's
some central responsibility and accountability for this.
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. The government looks to
the Director of National Intelligence as the security executive
agent for this process, and I believe, and the government
believes through executive order, that he is accountable for
the policies set forth, how we conduct investigations and
adjudications. And by virtue of--as executor of that program, I
believe that responsibility of leadership lies with me.
Senator King. When I was in business, I always tried to
formulate contracts and relationships so that you had one
throat to choke.
[Laughter.]
And that was the way you can get things done.
On this question of cyber security and the attacks on our
country, in my view and the view of many of us in this
committee and in other committees, one of the fundamental
problems with our response to this is that it's purely
defensive; that we're simply trying to patch our way out of
this problem; and that there is no deterrent, there is no cyber
doctrine or cyber strategy that will deter our adversaries and
make them think twice. We had testimony before Armed Services
from the head of the NSA that nothing we have done would,
quote, ``change the calculus of our adversaries.''
Do you believe that this is an area that we need to do more
work in and develop a public deterrence strategy so that those
who intend to attack us through cyber, just as they would
through kinetic, believe that they will and will certainly pay
a price?
Mr. Evanina. I do, sir.
Senator King. And could you expand on that a bit?
Mr. Evanina. Well, I believe two aspects of that. Number
one, I think our adversaries need to know that our deterrence
policy is real and it will manifest itself in their home base
so they understand it.
But I think more importantly, I think we owe it to the
American people for them to understand that the government has
policies and procedures in place to protect them, protect
private industry, from these cyber threats that we face.
So I concur we need to be a little bit more effective and
efficient with our deterrence policies.
Senator King. I hope you will help us develop that
strategy, because I think otherwise we're just going to
continue to be chipped away at. Again, we're looked on as a
kind of free lunch in this regard.
Thank you. I appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Evanina. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator King.
Vice Chairman Warner. I just want to echo what Senator King
has said, that we need that articulated cyber doctrine. I was,
again, disappointed that it appears the National Security
Council is now trying to eliminate the cyber position in the
White House, a direct report to the President. That does not
send the right signal.
But thank you very much, Bill, for your testimony. I look
forward to working with you.
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Burr. I have to admit I was questioning whether
Senator King was going to be quoted from this hearing about a
cyber doctrine or ``one throat to choke.''
[Laughter.]
I have a feeling I know which way it's going to go.
Senator King. I realized I was taking that risk as the
words were leaving my----
[Laughter.]
Chairman Burr. I think we have exhausted questions,
Director. Thank you, and I thank your family again for your
willingness to serve.
Let me note for members, QFRs are required before the end
of business today. It is my intent to move the Director out of
committee next week, so that we can get this to the floor as
quickly as we can.
With that, again, our thanks for your service.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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